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Abstract
Our analysis starts from the observation that with progressive consolidation in
retailing and the spread of private labels, retailers increasingly take over functions
in the vertical chain. Focusing on innovation, we isolate various reasons for why
when a large retailer grows in size, this can lead to an ine¢ cient shift of innovation
activity away from manufacturers and to the large retailer. One rationale for this is
the retailers control of access to consumers, which gives rise to a rent-appropriation
motive for innovation, next to a hold-up problem. With retail competition, through
crowding out the manufacturers innovative activity, a large retailer obtains a com-
petitive advantage vis-à-vis smaller retailers. We further analyze when ine¢ ciencies
are aggravated in case a large retailers presence threatens the manufacturer with
imitation of his innovations.
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1 Introduction
Large retailers have gained impressive buyer power, through organic growth and mergers,
and increasingly take over more of the functions in the vertical chain, such as distribution
and marketing. In addition, the advent of private labels has resulted in retailers directly
competing with manufacturers in certain product segments. As discussed in more detail
below, in particular food retailers increasingly compete also with branded products as they
move their private labels upmarket, sometimes becoming major innovators. In fact, as we
discuss below, in some newly developing up-market segments, such as organic food, their
share of the market by now exceeds that of branded products in some countries.
The shift of power and functions to retailers may often be attributable to more fun-
damental changes, such as changes in shopping habits or technology that, for instance,
may render it more e¢ cient if retailers take on a larger role in distribution. The growth
and exercise of buyer power, especially when arising from consolidation in the retailing
industry, may, however, negatively a¤ect not only horizontal competition but also the ef-
cient allocation of roles and functions in the vertical relationship. Which functions, such
as those of innovation, distribution, or marketing, are performed (more) by retailers or
by manufacturers is then possibly not only determined by e¢ ciency considerations, but it
may be the result of the exercise of buyer power.
In this paper, we focus on one such function, namely that of innovation. We ask in
particular whether, as a large retailer increasingly gains in size, the function of innovation
will be allocated e¢ ciently between retailers and a branded goods manufacturer. The
retailers size is the key trigger that makes innovation through private labels worthwhile,
as the retailer will only nd it protable to undertake these activities himself when he
can distribute the respective costs over a su¢ ciently large number of units. The analysis
isolates various forces why, with the growth of large retailers, manufacturersinnovation
could be ine¢ ciently crowded out.
Our analysis rst focuses on the case where we abstract from retail competition. There,
we show how a combination of the following two forces can ine¢ ciently tip innovative
activity towards a large retailer: a rent appropriationmotive for retailers who, where
their size permits, may prefer to innovate on their own even if this is less e¢ cient, as this
allows them to extract a larger share of the total prots that are created by the product
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innovation; and a hold-up problem for manufacturers, in case they still innovate and
must share the proceeds, which is aggravated when there is the threat of copying and
imitation by the retailer. We show when either of these two forces can be su¢ ciently large
so as to ine¢ ciently crowd out manufacturer innovation. These two forces (i.e., the hold-up
problem and the rent appropriation motive) work only towards ine¢ ciently allocating the
innovating role to the large retailer, but not in the opposite direction. The reason for this
asymmetry is that the manufacturer must rely on the retailer to have access to consumers
(gatekeeping), but not vice versa. Hence, a key contribution of this part of our analysis
is to show the implications of this asymmetry for dynamic e¢ ciency.
Once the manufacturer has access to di¤erent (competing) retailers, we identify another
force that may lead to an ine¢ cient and now even potentially anti-competitive substitution
of manufacturer innovative activity. Notably, this harms smaller retailers, once the activity
of a large retailer crowds out manufacturer innovation. When it dampens or even replaces
manufacturer innovation, the large retailers own innovative activity reduces smaller re-
tailersaccess to innovation and puts them at a competitive disadvantage. We show that
this is more likely when retail competition intensies.
While concentration among retailers varies from industry to industry and from country
to country, arguably food retailing has become increasingly concentrated in most European
countries. This is due to a wave of mergers and acquisitions, organic growth by the largest
retailers, and also the formation of buyer groups. For instance, as of 2010 the market
shares of the top ve rms in the ve largest European countries was 73% in France, 75%
in Germany, 32% in Italy, 64% in Spain, and 74% in the UK.1 Taking as an example the
German market, the respective gure was still below 60% ten years ago (i.e., more than
15 percentage points lower). The growing concentration directly a¤ects the importance
individual retailers have for manufacturers, which will be important for our subsequent
analysis.2
Our focus in this paper is not on the exercise of buyer power in order to achieve
discounts. In fact, our baseline analysis is set up such that, holding all else constant, a
larger retailer will not enjoy a discount. Moreover, even when a larger retailer obtains
1This is based on Europanel data and taken from British Brands Group (2012). European Commission
(2011, Chapter 3) provides more details on the growth of buyer power in European food retail across
di¤erent countries.
2More than ten years ago already, British food suppliers sold on average one third of their UK sales to
the biggest British customer and nearly 70% to their top ve customers (Competition Commission, 2000).
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better terms in some specications of the model, e.g., with the threat of imitation, the
discount will not a¤ect marginal wholesale prices. When they can o¤er products of the
same quality, small retailers will thus not be at a disadvantage. As we noted already,
small retailers may, however, su¤er when the large retailers activity crowds out innovation
by branded goods manufacturers, which is more likely when retail competition is intense.
Then, the larger retailer will enjoy a competitive advantage from his private label products.
A substantial fraction of the aforementioned growth in concentration in some market
segments has been fuelled by the spread of private labels. In fact, the market share
of private labels in European food retailing has risen signicantly, with now more than
40% in some countries such as the UK.3 From the retailersperspective, cost savings in
production, distribution, and marketing were originally seen as the primary motivation for
the introduction of private labels. These budget private labelswere positioned at the
lower end of the quality and price range.4 Overall, at this stage private label products
could basically only replace products with a weak brand image (national B-brands).
But this has changed recently. As we discuss below when relating our contribution to
the extant literature, in contrast to this literature we do not focus on the co-existence
of branded goods and private labels on a retailers shelf but, instead, on the observed
tendency towards a substitution.
Though the respective developments have also occurred elsewhere, reportedly in the
Netherlands or the UK, we take the example of Germany. There, over recent years growth
has taken place, in particular, in the range of added valueand premiumprivate label
products.5 To single out one particular segment, take that of organic food and beverages.
This is particularly interesting because, given the rather recent development, established
brand manufacturers do have a strong toehold, as in the case of national brands that
existed for decades or even for more than a century. The increasing innovative activity
of large retailers, which is the focus of this paper, shows itself in the increasing share of
private label products in this segment. In fact, by now the private label share in this
segment is even greater than that of national brands.6
3Metro Handelslexikon (2012/2013, p. 61).
4Characteristic of this low-price, low-quality strategy were so-called me too products, positioned
closely to established national brands (see, e.g., Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007).
5According to gures from GfK Consumer Scan (2013), the share of these private label products among
all products has increased from around 9% in 2007 to almost 13% in 2012.
6Again, based on data from the GfK Consumer Scan (2013), the private label share has increased from
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Our analysis can thus be brought towards answering the question how antitrust and
competition policy should look at these developments. Our analysis isolates e¤ects that
suggest that such a shift of innovative activity towards large retailers, as they increase in
size, may not always be e¢ cient. Though often there may exist an e¢ ciency rationale,
our analysis can inform antitrust and competition policy about possible unwanted conse-
quences of increasing buyer power that results, in particular, from further consolidation in
the retailing industry. Even when such concentration does not have immediate horizontal
e¤ects, e.g., as the respective acquisitions took place in di¤erent local markets, we show,
however, that it can have negative implications for competition as well. When only the
large retailer innovates, which will especially occur when he becomes su¢ ciently large and
when retail competition is su¢ ciently intense, this deprives smaller retailers of an equally
competitive position. In this case, the advantage of the large retailer, which he enjoys
through the innovative (private label) product, comes at a disadvantage to smaller retail-
ers. The causal link is the reduced innovative activity of the branded goods manufacturer.
Our contribution is related to but di¤erent from several contributions that analyze
incentives to invest in private label products. Most recently, Chambolle et al. (2014)
have analyzed the choice of outsourcing vs. insourcing for a private label product that is
stocked next to a branded product. They show various channels through which the result-
ing innovation activity can then be ine¢ ciently provided, notably as this can a¤ect the
subsequent bargaining position of a retailer and a manufacturer. Previous contributions
in the same spirit, that is, focusing on the co-existence of private label and branded prod-
ucts and on opportunism in the light of subsequent negotiations, include Bergés-Sennou
(2006) (see also Steiner (2004)). In this paper, we abstract fully from such co-existence
and focus, instead, on replacement. This is motivated by the preceding observations and
seems to capture an increasing tendency in the grocery industry. Abstracting from the
joint listing of other products allows us, in addition, to extend and generalize our analysis
of "vertical competition" to, for instance, downstream competition, retailers of di¤ering
size, or di¤erent sharing rules in negotiations.
Other contributions in the recent literature have focused more broadly on the inter-
action of the exercise of buyer power and manufacturer incentives, without considering
thus the issue of "vertical competition" that is the focus of this paper. While Battigalli et
41% in 2007 to 54% in 2012.
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al. (2007) focus on the negative (hold up) e¤ects, Inderst and Wey (2003, 2007) show
how buyer power can boost manufacturer incentives (see also Montez (2007)).7 Chen
(2013) provides a framework under which incentives of suppliers can become both weaker
or stronger.8
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the baseline case
of a bilateral monopoly. Section 3 introduces competition between a large and smaller
retailers. For some of the analysis we rst consider a simplied contractual game. Results
are then generalized in Section 4. Section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks. All proofs
are collected in the Appendix.
2 Bilateral Monopoly
2.1 Set-up
In this section, we consider a bilateral monopoly. As noted above, the objective of this
section is twofold. First, the present analysis provides a baseline case for the subsequent
introduction of retail competition in Section 3, which enables us to isolate more clearly the
e¤ect of competition on a large retailers decision whether to innovate or not. Second, the
analysis of the bilateral monopoly case is also of interest in itself, as it shows that, regardless
of the distribution of bargaining power, there is a strong tendency for the (gatekeeping)
retailer to substitute the manufacturers innovation even when this is ine¢ cient. Note,
however, that the focus on a single retailer does not allow us yet to vary a retailers size.
This will be captured later through the number of outlets that a large retailer, in contrast
to small retailers, controls.
Suppose thus for now that a single manufacturer faces a single retailer. Our focus is on
the decision to improve the quality of a single product. To bring out the innovative aspect of
the considered investment, we suppose that the products original (quality) characteristics
u0 can, through innovation, be increased to uI > u0. That is, we consider a non-incremental
change in product characteristics. Further, we suppose for simplicity that this leaves the
constant marginal cost of production unchanged at c  0. As discussed in the introduction,
7Abstracting from manufacturer incentives, Chambolle and Villas-Boas (2008) show how a retailer can
make use of stocking a di¤erentiated product of lower quality in order to increase his buyer power.
8See, for instance, Chen (2007) for a broader discussion of the relevance of buyer power for welfare and
e¢ ciency in an antitrust context.
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we thus consider the replacement of a single product, rather than a setting where products
of lower and higher quality (e.g., branded products and private labels) co-exist.
We abstract from the vertical relationship for a moment and suppose that the manu-
facturer could directly sell a product with quality u to consumers. Denote the resulting
prots by (u), where u 2 fu0; uIg. For the present analysis we need not specify whether
rms set prices or quantities at the nal (retail) stage. For specicity only, suppose that
a price p is chosen, which then gives rise to demand D(p;u). Demand is (where positive)
strictly decreasing in p and strictly increasing in u. Maximum prots are
(u) = max
p
[(p  c)D(p;u)] .
Return now to the original specication with a vertical relationship. The retailer could
procure the basic variant of the product, with quality u0, from the manufacturer as well
as from one of many other manufacturers. That is, the basic variant is supposed to
be produced and supplied competitively. In contrast, the enhanced variant with higher
quality uI can only be developed and produced in one of two possible ways. Either the
manufacturer innovates or the retailer takes the initiative and innovates (together with one
of the competitive manufacturers). In terms of applications, the second variant captures
the case in which an innovation is undertaken through a private label product.
When the manufacturer innovates, we suppose that he has to incur costs IM . When
instead the retailer innovates, he bears himself the investment costs, which are then equal
to IR. We do not rule out the possibility that both invest at the same time. (See below
for the precise timing.)9 Clearly, the innovative activity is only strictly protable if
 = (uI)  (u0) > minfIM ; IRg, (1)
which we assume to be the case in what follows.
The timing of decisions is as follows. In t = 1 both the manufacturer and the retailer
can decide whether to innovate. As we presently consider a bilateral monopoly, once the
retailer has innovated, there is no scope for the manufacturer to sell his product. That
is, the retailer acts as a gatekeeper to consumers. When neither has innovated, then only
the basic (and competitively provided) variant is on the market, in which case only the
9We do not allow the two parties to ex-ante contract on the innovative activity (including the speci-
cation of a sharing rule). In fact, such contracting is typical for private-label production, to which we
refer to as retailer innovation.
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retailer makes positive prots equal to (u0). Finally, when only the manufacturer has
innovated, then there is scope for mutually benecial negotiations that would ensure that
the superior quality is o¤ered by the retailer. These negotiations take place in t = 2:
Note that in t = 2, where investment costs are already sunk, the net surplus from
successful negotiations is given by , provided that the two sides can rule out double
marginalization and, thereby, realize the maximum feasible industry prots. This is the
case as we allow for non-linear contracts. To be precise, though this is without loss of
generality, we take a two-part tari¤wholesale contract with xed payment F and constant
marginal wholesale price w. Beyond this specication, i.e., that of joint prot maximizing
wholesale contracts, we are presently agnostic on how  is shared and, therefore, suppose
that a share  goes to the manufacturer and a share (1 ) to the retailer, where  2 [0; 1].
Formally, we could appeal to an application of the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution
with respective weights at this stage of the game. Note, however, that we will comment
explicitly on the corner cases with  = 0 and  = 1, where the outcome corresponds to
that where either the retailer or the manufacturer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
At the nal stage, t = 3, the product (of either quality u = uI or of quality u = u0) is
brought to the market.
2.2 Analysis with a Bilateral Monopoly
In what follows, we focus on a characterization of an equilibrium in pure strategies. We
start with some immediate observations. Clearly, the manufacturer has only an incentive
to innovate when he expects the retailer not to innovate himself. Further, this will only
result in non-negative prots when
   = IM= (2)
holds. Consequently, when condition (2) does not hold, the manufacturer refrains from in-
novating. Since the retailer acts as a gatekeeper to consumers, however, he can appropriate
the full surplus  when he innovates himself.
These two observations already summarize the two forces that will be at work in the
presently considered bilateral monopoly case: First, there is a hold-up problem for the
manufacturer, as he cannot appropriate the full net surplus from innovation, and which
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is more severe the lower is the manufacturers share ;10 second, when  is higher, so is
the incentive of the retailer to innovate himself in order to fully appropriate the respective
gains. In other words, as  increases, the hold-up problem is mitigated, but the rent
appropriationmotive for the retailer becomes stronger. Conversely, when  decreases,
the hold-up problem becomes more severe, though now the rent appropriationmotive
for the retailer is mitigated. Taken together, these two forces ensure that, regardless of the
distribution of bargaining power, the retailer may innovate even when this is ine¢ cient
given IR > IM . (When the converse holds, the retailer will always innovate.)
For the characterization in Proposition 1 we now apply in addition the following re-
nement. Whenever there is a multiplicity of (pure strategy) equilibria, we rule out those
equilibria of the innovation stage that are weakly Pareto dominated.
Proposition 1 In the case of a bilateral monopoly, there is generically a unique equilib-
rium in pure strategies. Whenever it is (weakly) more e¢ cient that the retailer innovates,
as IR  IM , then only this outcome arises in equilibrium. When the converse holds, so that
IR > IM , it would be more e¢ cient that the manufacturer innovates, but this, however,
need not be the case, as then either the retailer may innovate instead or even no innovation
could take place at all. Precisely, when IR > IM we have the following case distinction:
i) When, in addition, IR  , then the manufacturer innovates in case   , while for
 <  there is no innovation at all (with the exception of IR = , where also the outcome
with retailer innovation is supported).
ii) When, instead, IR < , then the manufacturer innovates only in case      =
IR=, while for both  <  and  >  the retailer innovates.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the innovation would be more e¢ ciently undertaken by the manufacturer, then
two types of ine¢ ciencies can arise according to Proposition 1: Either the innovative ac-
tivity (ine¢ ciently) shifts to the retailer or no innovation is undertaken at all. Clearly, the
latter case can only apply when innovation is too expensive for the retailer as IR   (case
i) in Proposition 1). In this case, the source of ine¢ ciency is solely a hold-up problem.
Instead, in case ii) of Proposition 1, which applies for IM < IR < , both the hold-
problem and the rent appropriation incentives of the retailer cause ine¢ ciencies. Though
10For a foundation of the hold-up problem see, e.g., Williamson (1979), Klein et al. (1978), and Gross-
man and Hart (1986).
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both e¤ects are always present, that is, unless either  = 0 or  = 1, somewhat informally
speaking, the hold-up problem is the stronger force for low  and the rent appropriation
incentive the stronger force for high . (When  = 0 only the hold-up problem is present,
while for  = 1 there is no longer a hold-up problem, though now the rent appropriation
incentives are strongest.) Corollary 1 summarizes the ine¢ ciencies.
Corollary 1 When in the bilateral monopoly case retailer innovation is less e¢ cient as
IR > IM , two types of ine¢ ciencies can arise:
i) The hold-up problem leads to a failure of innovation when   IR and  < .
ii) The combination of the hold-up problem and the rent appropriation incentives of the
retailer ine¢ ciently shift innovative activity to the retailer when  > IR and either  < 
or  > .
As noted above, both forces can lead to an ine¢ cient outcome and they are both
essentially tied to the gatekeeping role of the retailer. That is, the retailer is essential to
the manufacturer, which gives rise to the hold-up problem, while the converse does not
hold, which gives rise to the rent-appropriation incentives. It is interesting to note that
this asymmetry clearly does not exist when one considers an innovation game between two
or more manufacturers, each of which then uses prices and product quality to compete for
nal consumers. This asymmetry thus provides a key novelty of the present analysis.
2.3 Imitation
Maintaining the framework of a bilateral monopoly, we now introduce the following vari-
ation. As noted above, large retailers (with a well established line of private labels at
their disposal) are sometimes accused by branded goods manufacturers of imitating their
innovations and bringing them to market themselves. For instance, in food retailing there
may be indeed very limited legal protection against such copying and imitation. In this
section, we now allow for such imitation and analyze how it interacts with innovation
incentives. Next to providing additional implications also for policy, this analysis further
emphasizes the key distinction between an innovation game between manufacturers and
retailers, rather than between manufacturers, as (timely) innovation by a large retailer may
often be more likely and successful given the contractual interactions between retailers and
manufacturers.
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We rst provide some background. In the process of developing and marketing an in-
novation, even branded goods manufacturers may have to share information with retailers,
which cannot be protected by traditional intellectual property rights. Once a manufac-
turer has, for instance, tested a new product and generated consumer awareness for it, a
retailer could try to produce and market a private-label look-alikeon its own.11 Trade-
mark protection often seems not extensive enough to catch the use of such copycatsand
look-alikes.12
Before conducting the analysis, it is also worthwhile noting the di¤erence in imitation
incentives between a retailer and, say, another manufacturer. In the presently analyzed
case of a bilateral monopoly, an imitating manufacturer would have to compete head-
on with the original innovator for the gatekeeping retailers patronage. Such competition
would then shift most, if not all, of the benets towards the retailer. An imitating retailer,
instead, can enjoy the full benets from his imitation, as he controls access to consumers.
Once again it is the gatekeeping function that accounts for this di¤erence. We now analyze
what implications the possibility of retailer imitation has on the equilibrium outcome.
Note that we presently consider a single monopolistic retailer of xed size. Later, we
will allow for the possibility that a retailer only has incentives to imitate when he grows
su¢ ciently large in size. For now, however, we simply stipulate that the retailer would
have to incur costs K to imitate the manufacturers innovation. For convenience only, we
assume that such imitation is complete, i.e., it delivers quality uI . Obviously, imitation
must occur after t = 1. In fact, we suppose that it is at the retailers disposal right until
the nal period, t = 3. This implies that the retailer still has the option to imitate after
negotiations with the manufacturer failed.13
11In the economics literature, for instance, this has motivated the formal analysis in Allain et al. (2011).
The threat of copycats and look-alikes has also been recognised in the UKs grocery inquiry (Competition
Commission, 2008). The UKs Competition Commission warns that the exploitation by retailers of such
a position could, in theory, reduce the ability of brand owners to realise a return on product innovation
[. . . ], which would lead to ine¢ ciently low levels of investment into R&D in the future. The European
Commission noted in the Kesko/Tuko merger case that private label development is a key element in the
power wielded by retailers vis-à-vis branded daily consumer-goods producers. It enables retailers, who are
inevitably privy to commercially sensitive details regarding the branded goods producersproduct launches
and promotional strategies, to act as competitors as well as key customers of the products. This privileged
position increases the leverage enjoyed by retailers over branded-goods producers. (Kesko/Tuko (Case
IV/M.784) Commission Decision 97/277/EC[1997] OJ L 110/53 [152]).
12In particular, some jurisdictions, such as the UK, require proof of actual misleading.
13In fact, as noted above, it may also be precisely in the course of these negotiations that the retailer
gathers su¢ cient information that then enable him to successfully imitate the innovation.
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Clearly, imitation will only be of interest when
K < , (3)
so that the costs fall short of the surplus that can be extracted from the innovation.
Moreover, we specify that
K  IR, (4)
so that imitating involves (weakly) less resources for the retailer than innovating.
Obviously, the possibility to imitate is of relevance when only the manufacturer has
innovated. Taking the retailers outside option to imitate into account, the net surplus that
the manufacturer and the retailer could jointly realize from an agreement is then reduced
to K. This is again shared according to the respective fractions  for the manufacturer
and (1 ) for the retailer, so that the manufacturer will innovate only if   IM=K = K .
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium when imitation is possible.14
Proposition 2 In the case of a bilateral monopoly, there is a generically unique equilib-
rium in pure strategies when imitation is possible. Whenever it is (weakly) more e¢ cient
that the retailer innovates, as IR  IM , then only this outcome arises in equilibrium. When
the converse holds, we have the following case distinction:
i) When, in addition, IR  , then the manufacturer innovates in case   K, while
for  < K there is no innovation at all (with the exception of IR = , where also the
outcome with retailer innovation is supported).
ii) When, instead, IR < , then the manufacturer innovates only in case   K, while
for  < K the innovative activity shifts to the retailer.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As is immediate, the possibility of imitation makes the hold-up problem that the manu-
facturer faces more severe. It is further aggravated when imitation becomes less expensive
for lower values of K. In this case, welfare will be reduced either through a shift of the
innovative activity to the retailer or when both parties refrain from innovating altogether.
14In our framework, imitation does not occur in equilibrium, as in, e.g., Gallini (1992), who analyzes
the optimal patent length without, however, considering a vertical structure. Imitation rather constrains
the manufacturers rents and thus a¤ects his innovative activity, as in Tandon (1982) and Gilbert and
Shapiro (1990).
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Interestingly, however, the possibility of imitation reduces the retailers incentives to in-
novate solely because of a rent appropriation motive.
Corollary 2 When in the bilateral monopoly case retailer innovation is less e¢ cient as
IR > IM , the possibility of imitation has the following impact. It aggravates the hold-up
problem as  < K holds, so that for a larger range of values  there is now either an in-
e¢ cient shift of the innovative activity to the retailer (whenever   IR) or no innovation
takes place at all (whenever  < IR). On the other hand, as the rent appropriation motive
disappears, the manufacturer will e¢ ciently innovate for all higher values of , where his
bargaining power is su¢ ciently large.
3 Small vs. Large Retailers and Retail Competition
3.1 Set-up and Auxiliary Results
Suppose that there are now N  2 independent, local markets indexed by n = 1; ::; N .
In each market, two retail outlets compete for nal consumers. Further, suppose that
there is one large retailer who owns nL outlets, while the remaining 2N   nL outlets
are owned by small retailers. We restrict the latter to own each exactly one outlet. We
consider, in particular, a comparative analysis of nL. While the consideration of only a
single large retailer may often represent a far abstraction from reality, it serves to isolate
the implications of di¤erences in size, which are the focus of this section.
To abstract fully from horizontal e¤ects, i.e., monopolization issues, we suppose that
each of the large retailers nL outlets is located in a di¤erent market. Note that this implies
the restriction 1 < nL  N . That is, even at his maximum size, the large retailer only
controls one half of all outlets.15 This implies that even when the large retailer stocks
private labels, i.e., he decides to perform the innovative activity himself, the manufacturer
can still sell at least through the same number of outlets. Note that, in contrast to the
bilateral monopoly case, the existence of small retailers thus prevents the large retailer to
act as a full gatekeeper to nal consumers. We show that, despite this being the case, it
may still occur that only the large retailer innovates; in particular, when there is strong
retail competition.
15See Inderst and Wey (2011) and Inderst and Valletti (2011) for a corresponding setup.
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To bring this out most clearly, we now stipulate that IM = IR = I. That is, both
the manufacturer and the large retailer are now assumed to be equally e¢ cient when
performing the innovative activity. This also allows us to focus on a change in the large
retailers size nL. Our qualitative results would, however, not be a¤ected by including also
di¤erent investment costs for retailers and the manufacturer.
The timing of the game remains unchanged: Innovation can take place in t = 1, where
both the manufacturer and retailers can simultaneously decide whether to innovate or not.
Provided that a given retailer does not use his own product (i.e., after innovating himself),
in t = 2 negotiations take place with the manufacturer. Finally, in t = 3 products are sold
to nal consumers. We now esh out the respective strategies in detail.
At the nal stage, we specify that rms set prices (albeit the choice of price competition
is inconsequential for our results). Suppose that in a given market the two outlets set prices
pi and that the respective qualities of their products are ui, with i = 1; 2. Then, demand
for outlet i in this market is given by D(pi; pj;ui; uj), with i 6= j. When this is positive,
it is strictly increasing in own quality and strictly decreasing in own price. The extent
to which demand increases with the rival outlets price pj and decreases with the rival
outlets quality uj will depend on the intensity of competition. We provide an illustrative
example below.
Turn now to negotiations in t = 2. In the subsequent section, we will again allow for
an arbitrary sharing rule of net surplus in each bilateral negotiation. There, we will also
allow for di¤erences between the large retailers and the small retailers share. For this we
will then combine again an axiomatic (Nash) bargaining solution with our noncooperative
investment game. However, to rst simplify the exposition of the main results we presently
consider the case where there is a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er by the manufacturer to all retailers
that did not innovate themselves. (This will exactly correspond, as previously, to the case
where in the generalized bargaining case the manufacturers share of net surplus is equal
to one, i.e.,  = 1.)
We again allow for non-linear wholesale contracts and specify a xed fee F and a con-
stant marginal wholesale price w. Now with competing retailers, we make the assumption
that wholesale contracts between the manufacturer and each retailer are private informa-
tion. To move on, we make use of the following well-known result.
Lemma 1 As we consider non-observable, non-linear (precisely, two-part tari¤ ) whole-
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sale contracts, the following result obtains for negotiations in t = 2 between an innovating
manufacturer and any retailer that does not innovate. When retailers hold passive be-
liefs with regards to other retailerscontracts, which is what we assume to hold, then the
respective marginal wholesale price is equal to marginal cost of production, w = c.
Passive beliefs are commonly assumed in the literature and prescribe that any given
retailer does not change his beliefs about other retailerscontracts when he receives, in the
presently analyzed take-it-or-leave-it o¤er game, a non-anticipated o¤er from the manu-
facturer.16 We assume that an equilibrium with passive beliefs exists.17 Given Lemma 1,
wholesale contracting is basically restricted to the determination of the xed part. For
the presently analyzed take-it-or-leave-it o¤er game, in equilibrium the choice of the xed
part of the contract will make the respective retailer just indi¤erent between acceptance
and rejection.18
Note also that non-observability of contracts also rules out the possibility that the
manufacturer could serve only one retailer, thereby dampening downstream competition.
From Lemma 1 we can now already use that in t = 3 the two retailers in any given
market will, next to observing the respective qualities u1 and u2, also know the respective
marginal costs of the competitor (i.e., wholesale prices, as we abstract from additional
costs of handling). While we explicitly derive the respective equilibrium prices for the
Hotelling case below, for now it is su¢ cient to work with equilibrium prots. Thus, we only
need to assume that these are uniquely determined. Then, substituting out equilibrium
prices, the prots of outlet 1 and outlet 2 in a given market will depend on own quality
and their rivals quality and are denoted by (u1; u2) and (u2; u1), respectively, with
u1; u2 2 fu0; uIg. (Note that these are gross of the xed part of the wholesale contract.)
That is, if, in a given market n, outlet 1 has access to quality uI , whereas its rival only
16See Hart and Tirole (1990), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), and OBrien and Sha¤er (1994). Note,
however, that, similar to our generalized approach in the following section, OBrien and Sha¤er (1994)
use an axiomatic Nash bargaining approach with bilateral negotiations and wholesale contracts that are
private information, rather than simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers.
17For the case of Bertrand competition it needs to hold that the cross elasticity of demand is strictly
smaller than half of the elasticity of demand for an equilibrium with passive beliefs to exist (Rey and
Vergé, 2004, Proposition 2).
18Note also that the assumption of unobservable contracts allows us to abstract from any role that
the manufacturer could play to dampen competition, i.e., even without an innovation, namely by raising
rivalsmarginal costs and distributing the gains from monopolization through adjusting the xed part.
Also note that there is no commitment as to the number and identity of supplied retailers, which is why
an innovating manufacturer will end up supplying all non-innovating retailers. (When competition is not
too intense, this would also indeed maximize total industry prots.)
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o¤ers the basic variant u0, then outlet 1s and outlet 2s prots become (uI ; u0) and
(u0; uI), respectively.
An increase in the own products quality increases prots, while a higher quality of the
rivals product (weakly) reduces an outlets prot: 1 > 0 and 2  0, where the latter
holds strictly in case of competition. As is standard, we further assume that 11 > 0 and
12 < 0: innovations are strategic substitutes. That this holds for most commonly used
oligopoly models, including the subsequently analyzed Hotelling model, has been shown
by Athey and Schmutzler (2001). For our case with a discrete choice between the basic
variant and innovation this implies19
(u0; uI) < (u0; u0)  (uI ; uI) < (uI ; u0) (5)
and
(uI ; u0)  (u0; u0)  (uI ; uI)  (u0; uI), (6)
which again hold strictly with competition.
Dene h = (uI ; u0) (u0; u0) andl = (uI ; uI) (u0; uI), where h > l follows
immediately from (6). Without retail competition h and l are identical, as there is no
di¤erence between pioneering and catching-up with a single outlet per market n, i.e., an
outlet can only benet from having access to the higher quality but not from, e.g., gaining
a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the rival.
By assuming that
h < I < Nh (7)
a small retailer will never want to innovate, while a large retailer may want to innovate
when he becomes su¢ ciently large (at least, when owning an outlet in each of the N
independent markets). This allows us to restrict attention to the interesting case where
the large retailers size can make a di¤erence to innovation incentives.
3.2 Equilibrium for the Innovation Game
We rst present some immediate results on the large retailers and the manufacturers
incentives to innovate. Recall that we presently consider the case where the manufacturer
19Notice that when (u0; u0) = (uI ; uI) holds, then in the symmetric case all benets from the higher-
quality products would be competed away to the benet of nal consumers. This is especially true for the
Hotelling model.
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can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers (see, however, Section 4 for a generalization). Thus,
when only the manufacturer innovates, he can extract the di¤erence l from each outlet
(i.e., exactly l from each small retailer and nLl from the large retailer). Note for this
that the alternative at each outlet is that it o¤ers only the basic variant, while its rival
o¤ers the innovative variant.
The manufacturers incentives to innovate will be lower when he expects that his in-
novation will only be bought by 2N   nL outlets, as the large retailer innovates as well.
Turning to the large retailers incentives, these depend on the anticipated choice of the
manufacturers strategy only when there is competition (so that h > l). With competi-
tion the large retailers incentives are strictly larger when he expects the manufacturer not
to innovate. Calculating explicitly the respective prots, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2 The manufacturer will always innovate when he expects that no one else in-
novates. Instead, when he expects the large retailer to innovate, he (weakly) prefers to
innovate only when
nL  2N   I=l = nM :
Further, while small retailers will never innovate, the large retailers incentives to innovate
are as follows: He (weakly) prefers to innovate when
nL  I=h = nR
in case he expects the manufacturer not to innovate and when
nL  I=l = nR
in case he expects the manufacturer to innovate.
Now, we are in the position to characterize the equilibrium in the case of retail com-
petition. Proposition 3 summarizes our results.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the large retailer owns an outlet in nL of N markets, while
in each market another outlet is owned by a small retailer. Innovation comes at cost
I to either the manufacturer or a retailer. Presently, the innovating manufacturer can
make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to retailers. The innovation game has then the following
equilibrium outcome:
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i) When Nl  I, then both the large retailer and the manufacturer innovate if nL > nR
(duplication), while for nL  nR only the manufacturer innovates.
ii) When Nl < I, then there are multiple equilibria, where either the large retailer or
the manufacturer innovates if both nL  nM and nL  nR, while, otherwise, only the
manufacturer innovates.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Our ndings in Proposition 3 are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Equilibrium of the Innovation Game in the Case of Retail
Competition and Take-It-Or-Leave-It O¤ers.
In order to disentangle the impact of retail competition, we consider rst the case
where there is no retail competition implying h = l. In Figure 1, the black triangle
would then disappear. There is duplication for nL > nR and, otherwise, innovation by the
manufacturer only. Thus, the only ine¢ ciency is due to duplication, which follows from the
large retailers rent appropriation incentives. Further, note that duplication becomes more
likely the more outlets nL the large retailer owns, as this makes innovation more benecial
for him. Presently, a hold-up problem does not emerge due to the assumption that the
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manufacturer can extract the entire net surplus when negotiating with non-innovating
retailers (see, however, Section 4).
With retail competition, the large retailer has an additional incentive to innovate when
he has exclusive access to the innovation: He can realize a competitive advantage over his
smaller rivals, which grants him pioneering gains h > l. Graphically, this gives rise to
the black triangle in Figure 1. In this parameter region, we know from Proposition 3 that
there are two equilibrium outcomes: one where only the large retailer innovates and one
where only the manufacturer innovates. In each case, the anticipation that the other party
innovates makes an additional investment unprotable, while such an innovation becomes
protable when it is anticipated that the other party does not innovate. Interestingly,
in contrast to the bilateral monopoly case, this multiplicity is no longer ruled out by
application of Pareto dominance. In particular, when only the large retailer innovates,
then this now deprives other retailers of an access to the innovative product, given that
the anticipated innovation of the large retailer essentially crowds out the manufacturers
innovation. This gives the large retailer a competitive advantage in the retail market
vis-à-vis smaller retailers, who rely on the manufacturers innovation. Clearly, to repeat
this only happens when there is indeed competition, as only then it holds that h > l.
Further below we will analyze how intensity of competition a¤ects these di¤erences more
gradually, thereby making such crowding outmore likely.
Corollary 3 Suppose that the innovating manufacturer can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers
to non-innovating retailers. Then, with retail competition there are two possible ine¢ cien-
cies that arise when the large retailer owns su¢ ciently many outlets (high nL). First, there
can be duplication of investment, as both the large retailer and the manufacturer innovate,
in which case the high-quality product is o¤ered both as a private label and as a branded
product; second, the large retailers anticipated innovation can even crowd out the man-
ufacturers innovation, so that only the large retailer o¤ers a (private label) high-quality
product, whereas small retailers do not.
Clearly, the welfare loss from duplication is exactly equal to the respective costs I,
which are incurred twice. Consider now the case of crowding out. Compared to the
case where only the manufacturer, instead of only the large retailer, innovates, the same
investment costs are incurred, namely exactly I. Welfare is, however, strictly lower when
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only the large retailer innovates. Precisely, the respective loss in welfare is made up as
follows. There is rst a direct e¤ect that arises from the crowding out of manufacturer
innovation: The respective consumers at small retailersoutlets can no longer enjoy the
high-quality product (and the respective small retailers will no longer be able to make
higher prots from this o¤ering). An additional e¤ect arises as some consumers will now,
compared to the symmetric outcome, no longer shop at their preferred (small retailers)
outlets but instead switch to an outlet controlled by the large retailer. They will thus no
longer shop at the outlet for which they would otherwise have the strongest horizontal
preference, e.g., in terms of lower transportation costs as in the Hotelling model that we
analyze next.
Hotelling Model We now consider a Hotelling model with linear transportation costs
and a mass one of uniformly distributed consumers over the unit interval. Outlets are
located at both ends of the unit interval. If a consumer, whose location is x, shops at
outlet 1 (2) which is located at 0 (1), then his net utility is given by U = u1   p1   x
(U = u2   p2   (1   x)), where u1 and u2 represent a consumers gross utility from
purchasing the respective product, with u1; u2 2 fu0;uIg. This implies that the mass
x = 1=2 + [(p2   p1) + (u1   u2)] =2 shops at outlet 1.
Based on this model, we can immediately derive
l =
(uI   u0) [   (uI   u0)=6]
3
(8)
and
h =
(uI   u0) [ + (uI   u0)=6]
3
. (9)
Further, note that @l=@ > 0 and @h=@ < 0. That is, increased competition lowers
(catch-up gains) l, while it increases (pioneering gains) h.
This provides the following implications for duplication and crowding out. As com-
petition intensies, duplication becomes less likely. This is quite intuitive as more intense
competition reduces the large retailers gains in case of duplication, nLl. This e¤ect is
illustrated by a downward rotation of the line that depicts nR in Figure 1. Consider next
the area of crowding out. Here, note that both nM and n

R decrease when competition
intensies. In particular, while the manufacturers incentives to innovate in case he ex-
pects the large retailer to innovate are stied, the large retailers incentives to innovate in
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case he expects the manufacturer not to innovate increase. Thus, the outcome occurs for
a wider range of values of nL and I, which graphically corresponds to a widening of the
black triangle in Figure 1.
In the following corollary, we summarize the e¤ects of increased competitive pressure
on the prevalence of duplication and crowding out.
Corollary 4 Increased competitive pressure, measured by a reduction of the horizontal
product di¤erentiation parameter  for the Hotelling model, has the following e¤ects: It
makes duplication less likely but makes it more likely that only the large retailer innovates.
For completeness we end this section with an explicit calculation of welfare. After
substituting out equilibrium prices, producer surplus in a given local market n equals
PS(u1; u2) =
(u1   u2)2
9
+  (10)
and, after substituting for the critical type x, consumer surplus equals
CS(u1; u2) =
xR
0
[u1   p1   x]dx+
1R
x
[u2   p2   (1  x)]dx (11)
=
(u1 + u2   2c)
2
+
(u1   u2)2
36
  5
4
.
Summing up, welfare (gross of investment costs) that is generated in a local market is then
!(u1; u2) =
(u1 + u2   2c)
2
+
5(u1   u2)2
36
  
4
. (12)
When uL is the equilibrium quality of the large retailer and uS that of small retailers,
aggregate welfare (gross of investment costs) is thus

 = nL!(uL; uS) + (N   nL)!(uS; uS), (13)
so that in case of crowding outthe resulting welfare loss equals
nL [!(uI ; uI)  !(uI ; u0)]  (N   nL) [!(uI ; uI)  !(u0; u0)]
= (uI   u0)

N   nL
2
  5nL
36
(uI   u0)

:
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3.3 Imitation
The large retailers size, whenever su¢ ciently large, also provides incentives to imitate the
manufacturers innovation. We again stipulate that a retailer incurs xed imitation costs
K. Additionally, we specify that K  I, so that imitation is less costly for the retailer
than innovating. From
K > (uI ; uI)  (u0; uI) = l
a small retailer would never have su¢ cient incentives to imitate an innovation (nor to
innovate himself, as K  I). However, the large retailer has su¢ cient incentives to imitate
when the number of his outlets is su¢ ciently large, as
nL  K
l
= nK . (14)
An immediate observation is now that when nL < nK the threat of imitation is not
credible and the previous characterization still holds. There is a second immediate case.
Recall that for nL < nM the manufacturer (strictly) prefers to innovate even when the large
retailer innovates as well. The interesting di¤erence with imitation is now that in this case
we need no longer distinguish whether the large retailer indeed innovates or not. The by
assumption cheaper possibility of imitation (or, more precisely, the credible threat of
imitation) ensures that the large retailer would not want to duplicate the manufacturers
innovation.
We next discuss the case where the large retailer is su¢ ciently large, so that both
nL  nK and nL  nM . As we show now, with retail competition the hold-up problem,
that is induced by the threat of imitation, can exacerbate the shift of innovative activity
away from the manufacturer to the large retailer.
Suppose rst that only the manufacturer innovates and subsequently negotiates with
retailers. When (14) is satised, the manufacturer realizes altogether the surplus K from
the large retailer, while he obtains the surplus (2N   nL)l from small retailers. Thus, if
the threat of imitation is credible, then with every outlet that the large retailer acquires,
the manufacturer loses exactly the respective prots l, so that all joint prots beyond
K, which are given by nLl   K, are left to the large retailer. This loss is particularly
large as we presently consider a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er by the manufacturer, so that there
is no hold-up problem vis-à-vis small retailers. It follows that the manufacturer will only
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innovate when
nL  nM = 2N   (I  K)=l.
If the large retailers own innovation incentives are not yet su¢ ciently high, then the threat
of imitation can now lead to a failure of innovation. Intuitively, this is the case when the
respective costs of imitation K are su¢ ciently low, as they bound the manufacturers own
prots from imitation.
The threat of imitation makes it also more likely that only the large retailer innovates,
so that the aforementioned crowding outdeprives smaller competitors of the innovative
product. While without imitation this occurred only for parameter values where there
was also an equilibrium with only manufacturer innovation, we show that the threat of
imitation leads to an outcome where the unique equilibrium prescribes that only the large
retailer innovates. This additionally tilts the equilibrium outcome ine¢ ciently away from
manufacturer innovation, where also smaller retailers could o¤er the innovative product.
To streamline the subsequent exposition of the equilibrium, we now invoke a parame-
ter restriction. Recall that with competition (and without imitation) in case of multiple
equilibria, where either the manufacturer or the large retailer innovated, none of these
was Pareto dominated.20 As we already observed, the threat of imitation grants a non-
innovating large retailer higher prots. This is especially true when compared to the low
prots under the presently considered case of a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er by the manufacturer
when the threat of imitation is not credible. Still, with competition the benets of inno-
vating compared to those of imitating stem from a competitive advantage that the large
retailer enjoys over his smaller rivals (through pioneering gains) in case the manufacturer
abstains from innovation. These benets are larger when the retailer owns more outlets
but also when competition is more intense. We nd (cf. the proof of Proposition 4) that
the large retailer would never want to give upthe position as the sole innovator if
nL >
I  Ke , (15)
with e = (uI ; u0)   (uI ; uI). That is, whenever imitation pays and the large retailer
owns su¢ ciently many outlets such that (15) holds, he will never benet from giving up
his pioneering role in favor of manufacturer innovation. One observation regarding e
20This was di¤erent in the case without competition, where we could thereby eliminate the outcome
where only the large retailer innovated.
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is particularly noteworthy. When in case of symmetry, all the benets from innovation
are competed away to the benet of nal consumers, so that (uI ; uI) = (u0; u0), thene = h, in which case condition (15) is always satised.21 This is especially true for the
Hotelling model.
Proposition 4 Consider the case of retail competition where the innovating manufacturer
can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to retailers and where imitation is possible. When nL <
nK, then, even for the large retailer, imitation is not credible and does not a¤ect the
equilibrium outcome as characterized in Proposition 3. Further, when nL < nM , then only
the manufacturer innovates. When instead the large retailer is su¢ ciently large so that
both nL  nK and nL  nM , then the threat of imitation leads to the following equilibrium
outcome:
i) K  N(h l) (relatively high imitation costs): If the large retailer is still su¢ ciently
small so that nL < nR, then only the manufacturer innovates. Otherwise, for nL  nR
there are multiple equilibria where either the large retailer or the manufacturer innovates.
ii) K < N(h   l) (relatively low imitation costs): If the large retailer is su¢ ciently
small so that nL  nM , then the equilibrium outcome is identical with the previous case
where K  N(h  l). If, however, nL > nM , then there is now a failure of innovation
in case of nL < nR, while for nL  nR only the large retailer innovates.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Recall that, whenever credible, the threat of imitation creates a hold-up problem vis-à-
vis the large retailer, as the manufacturer realizes only K instead of the entire net surplus
nLl. However, this does not inevitably lead to ine¢ ciencies when compared with the case
where imitation is not possible or not credible. Additionally, xed imitation costs must be
su¢ ciently low, as K < N(h  l). Then, e¢ cient manufacturer innovation is crowded
out by the large retailer. This results in crowding out, as the small retailers are deprived
of the high-quality product. If, however, the large retailers number of outlets is still low,
then neither him nor the manufacturer performs the innovative activity, so that there is a
failure of innovation. It is straightforward that both types of ine¢ ciencies become more
severe when imitation becomes cheaper, as K decreases.22
21For a more detailed discussion see the Proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix.
22This follows from two observations. First, the manufacturers innovation incentives are stied, i.e.,
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Finally, notice that the threat of imitation also has positive e¤ects from a welfare
perspective. As in the case of a bilateral monopoly, imitation eliminates the large retailers
rent appropriation motives, so that duplication never constitutes an equilibrium outcome.
Corollary 5 In the case of retail competition, where the innovating manufacturer can
make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to retailers, the credible threat of imitation has the following
welfare implications. When the large retailer is su¢ ciently large (nL > nM) and xed
imitation costs are relatively low (K < N(h  l)), then the hold-up problem leads to a
failure of innovation if the large retailer is not too large (nL < nR), while, otherwise, it
induces only the large retailer to o¤er a (private label) high-quality product. Both types of
ine¢ ciencies are exacerbated when imitation becomes cheaper. Imitation also eliminates
the large retailers rent appropriation incentives, so that ine¢ cient duplication never occurs
in equilibrium.
Notice that, in general, the impact of increased competitive pressure on the prevalence
of ine¢ ciencies appears to be ambiguous. The same is true when explicitly referring to
the Hotelling model. However, we can at least isolate the e¤ects of increased competitive
pressure and thereby stress the trade-o¤s from a welfare perspective. First, recall that
increased competitive pressure, measured by a reduction of the horizontal product di¤er-
entiation parameter  , increases pioneering gains h. It follows that the large retailers
incentive to innovate if he expects the manufacturer not to innovate is boosted, i.e., nR
decreases. Further, catch-up gains l decrease at the same time, which negatively a¤ects
both the manufacturers incentive to innovate when he expects the large retailer to re-
frain from innovation and the large retailers incentive to imitate, i.e., nM decreases, while
nK increases. Taken altogether, on the one hand, these three e¤ects relax the restriction
K < N(h   l) so that the range of values K for which the hold-up problem is ac-
companied by ine¢ ciencies becomes larger. On the other hand, as imitation becomes less
benecial for the large retailer, the threat of imitation is less likely to be credible which
reduces the range of values K for which the hold-up problem indeed leads to ine¢ ciencies.
nM decreases as the surplus that he can appropriate from the large retailer is reduced. Second, the large
retailers incentive to imitate the manufacturers innovation increases, i.e., nK decreases, as imitation
becomes even more favorable when K falls.
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4 Generalization of the Analysis with Coexistence of
Small and Large Retailers
In this section, we consider a more general distribution of bargaining power in the case
of retail competition.23 Recall that in the bilateral monopoly case we took an axiomatic
Nash bargaining approach and specied that the manufacturer receives the fraction  of
the net surplus (leaving the retailer with the fraction 1   ).24 To additionally account
for possible di¤erences between the large and small retailers in terms of bargaining power,
we now allow for two di¤erent sharing rules, given by S  L, with S; L 2 [0; 1].25
That is, when bilateral negotiations take place, the large retailer may be in a position to
extract a larger share from the net surplus than small retailers (albeit we also allow for
the symmetric case). Otherwise, we maintain all the assumptions made in Section 3.
An immediate observation is that the more general distribution of bargaining power
again gives rise to a hold-up problem, as the manufacturer cannot appropriate the entire
net surplus from innovation when 1 > S  L. He only extracts S(2N   nL)l from
the small retailers and LnLl from the large retailer, respectively. It follows that, in
contrast to the case where he could make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, the manufacturer will
only innovate when
nL  nM = S2N=(S   L)  I=l[(S   L)]
in case he expects the large retailer not to innovate. This is similar to Section 3 when
imitation was analyzed, except that, now, it is the retailersbargaining power (whenever
1 > S  L) which diminishes the manufacturers innovation incentives, rather than the
(credible) threat of imitation by the large retailer. Overall and correspondent to the e¤ects
of imitation, when the large retailer owns su¢ ciently many outlets, the hold-up problem
may lead either to a failure of innovation or to a unique equilibrium where only the large
23Note that in contrast to Inderst and Wey (2011) and Inderst and Valletti (2011), who also consider
a setup with retail competition, we additionally account for possible di¤erences between small and large
retailers in terms of bargaining power.
24Notice that in this respect our approach resembles OBrien and Sha¤ers (1994) work, which also
combines a non-cooperative setting with an axiomatic (Nash) bargaining solution. However, OBrien
and Sha¤er (1994) do not consider (noncooperative) investment decisions preceding bilateral negotiations,
which is rather the focus of our paper.
25See, e.g., Marx and Sha¤er (1999), who, in a setup with two (monopoly) sellers using a common
(monopoly) retailer, also consider a more general distribution of bargainig power. However, they are not
concerned with buyer power and thus do not invoke an assumption resembling S  L.
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retailer innovates. In the latter case, manufacturer innovation is crowded out for sure, so
that small retailers are deprived of the innovative product.
The more general distribution of bargaining power has a further implication whenever
the large retailer is able to extract a larger share of the net surplus than small retailers,
as S > L. In that case, the manufacturer looses (S   L)l per outlet when the large
retailer grows in size. Hence, whenever 1 > S > L the hold-up problem is aggravated if
the large retailer grows in size. Note at this point that in our analysis the di¤erence in the
behavior and payo¤ of retailers is obtained endogenously from a di¤erence in size. While
this is outside the scope of the model, one could also conjecture that, even without the
threat of imitation, the share of surplus that the manufacturer can extract from a smaller
retailer is larger, S > L, e.g., as it pays for the larger retailer to employ more experienced
negotiators. Our subsequent characterization of outcomes is however independent of this
assumption. In Lemma 3 we rst present the manufacturers and the large retailers
innovation incentives.
Lemma 3 The manufacturer (weakly) prefers to innovate only when nL  nM = S2N=(S 
L)  I=l[(S  L)] in case he expects that no one else innovates and when nL  nM =
2N   I=Sl < nM in case he expects the large retailer to innovate. Further, while small
retailers will never innovate, the large retailers incentives to innovate are as follows: He
(weakly) prefers to innovate only when nL  nR = I=h in case he expects the man-
ufacturer not to innovate and when nL  nR = I=Ll > nR in case he expects the
manufacturer to innovate.
Using Lemma 3 we can next characterize the equilibrium at the innovation stage.
Before doing so, in order to restrict case distinctions, we invoke an assumption similar to
(15). Again, this ensures that we do not have to distinguish between cases where we can
rule out multiplicity by appealing to Pareto dominance and where this can not be done.
Precisely, specifying that
nL >
Ie+ Ll , (16)
guarantees that the large retailer will always prefer to innovate alone (and thus to realize
pioneering gains) rather than letting the manufacturer innovate instead. Again, in analogy
to condition (15), this is satised in particular when (uI ; uI) = (u0; u0) holds, as in the
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Hotelling model. Further, this restriction seems justied, as our key interest is to analyze
the implications of the presence and further growth of a large retailer.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the large retailer owns an outlet in nL of N markets, while
in each market another outlet is owned by a small retailer. Innovation comes at cost I
to either the manufacturer or a retailer and the manufacturer receives S and L of the
net surplus when negotiating with a small retailer and the larger retailer, respectively. The
innovation game has then the following outcome:
i) When LNl  I, then both the large retailer and the manufacturer innovate if nL > nR
(duplication), while for nL  nR only the manufacturer innovates.
ii) When LNl < I, we need to distinguish two cases: If S + L > h=l, then
there are multiple equilibria where either the large retailer or the manufacturer innovates
when nL  nM and nL  nR simultaneously hold, while, otherwise, only the manufacturer
innovates. If, however, S + L  h=l, then we additionally obtain for nL  nM that
the large retailer innovates alone whenever also nL  nR, while, otherwise, there is no
innovation at all (though for nL = nM as well as for nL = n

R both outcomes with and
without investment can be supported).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Our ndings in Proposition 5 are illustrated by Figure 2 (a), which depicts the equi-
librium in case of S + L > h=l, and by Figure 2 (b), which depicts the equilibrium
in case of S + L  h=l.
For ease of exposition, the black triangle in Figure 2 (b) representing crowding out
covers both multiplicity as well as the case where only the large retailer innovates in
equilibrium. However, notice that the crucial di¤erence between those two outcomes is
that the former may lead to crowding out, while the latter leads to this for sure.
As previously, we again consider separately the implications for welfare. By allowing
for a more general distribution of bargaining power we have the following (additional)
e¤ects in terms of welfare. First, when retailers extract a share of the manufacturers
innovation, even without the threat of imitation, then this sties the large retailers rent
appropriation incentives and thus makes duplication less likely. Graphically, this implies
that the range of values nL and I for which duplication constitutes an equilibrium, i.e.,
the light grey area in Figures 2 (a) and 2 (b), becomes smaller as L decreases (notably
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compared to L = 1 under the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of the manufacturer). This follows
from the large retailer being now able to extract the share (1  L) from the net surplus
of each of his outlets when negotiating with the manufacturer.
Figure 2: Equilibrium of the Generalized Innovation Game in
Case of (a) S + L > h=l (Upper Graph) and (b)
S + L  h=l (Lower Graph).
Second, as indicated above, the more general distribution of bargaining power leads
to a hold-up problem whenever 1 > S  L. This prevents, in case of innovation, the
manufacturer to extract the entire surplus from non-innovating retailers. Notice that when
S > L the hold-up problem problem is aggravated when the large retailer expands his
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size. As in the case of imitation in Section 3, the hold-up problem itself does not inevitably
lead to ine¢ ciencies. Rather, the large retailer must additionally have su¢ cient incentives
to realize a competitive advantage over his smaller rivals such that S + L  h=l
holds. If these criteria are met, then either a failure of innovation or crowding out of
manufacturer innovation will occur when the large retailer owns su¢ ciently many outlets
(as nL > nM). This is depicted in the upper part of Figure 2 (b).
Finally, given that S+L > h=l, multiplicity becomes more severe and thus occurs
for a wider range of values nL and I whenever S < 1. Graphically, this corresponds to
a widening of the black triangle in Figure 2 (a) when compared to the case where the
manufacturer makes take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to small retailers, i.e., S = 1. This follows
immediately from the manufacturers stied incentives to innovate, as he now also faces a
hold-up problem vis-à-vis small retailers when S < 1. As a result, this will enhance, all
other things held constant, the chances for crowding outto arise.
Corollary 6 Suppose that the innovating manufacturer receives S and L of the net
surplus when negotiating with a small retailer and the larger retailer, respectively. Then
with retail competition there are two possible ine¢ ciencies that arise when the large retailer
owns su¢ ciently many outlets (high nL) and pioneering gains are su¢ ciently low (S +
L > h=l). First, there can be duplication, in which case the high-quality product is
o¤ered both as a private label and as a branded product. Second, there can be crowding out
resulting from multiplicity so that only the large retailer o¤ers a (private label) high-quality
product, whereas small retailers do not. If, however, pioneering gains are su¢ ciently high
(S + L  h=l), then there is additionally a failure of innovation, so that the high-
quality product is not o¤ered at all, and there can be crowding out for sure (i.e., as the
unique equilibrium outcome).
To analyze the impact of increased competitive pressure in theN local and independent
markets on the outcome of the innovation game and thus on the types of ine¢ ciencies, we
turn again to the Hotelling model.
Hotelling Model As in the case where the manufacturer makes take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers
to non-innovating retailers, increased competitive pressure will a¤ect the outcome of the
innovation game via l and h. Recall that, as @l=@ > 0 and @h=@ < 0, pioneering
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gains are increased, whereas catch-up gains are lowered when competition gets more erce.
Hence, we can derive the following implications in terms of ine¢ ciencies. First, duplication
becomes less protable, which is graphically illustrated by a downward rotation of the line
that depicts nR in Figures 2 (a) and 2 (b). However, both a failure of innovation as well
as crowding outbecome more likely when competitive pressure increases. This follows
from the manufacturers lower incentives to innovate (irrespective of his expectation about
the large retailers innovation decision), i.e., both nM and n

M decrease, and from increased
pioneering gains, i.e., nR decreases. Together, the impact of increased competition on the
incidence of crowding outcan thus be illustrated by a widening of the black triangle in
both Figure 2 (a) and in Figure 2 (b). We summarize our results in Corollary 7.
Corollary 7 Increased competitive pressure, measured by a reduction of the horizontal
product di¤erentiation parameter  for the Hotelling model, has the following e¤ects: It
makes duplication less likely but makes it more likely that both only the large retailer in-
novates and a failure of innovation occurs.
5 Conclusion
Economists traditionally view retailers as agents that bridge the distance between man-
ufacturers and consumers, both in time and space. They o¤er products in stores that
are closer to consumers than, say, the manufacturersplants. But they do much more,
and increasingly so. While retailers are still, in a nutshell, performing the nal step in
the distribution of merchandise and while they are still primarily engaged in the activity
of purchasing products from other rms so as to resell those goods to consumers, such
a description disguises the increasing role that retailers play across all functions, notably
but not exclusively through private labels.
The analysis in this paper has focused on innovation as one function that may increas-
ingly shift away from manufacturers and into the hands of large retailers. Retailers also
take over an increasing part of distribution. For instance, where manufacturers previ-
ously delivered right to individual stores and possibly even controlled the display of their
products, large retailers may now collect shipments directly at the factory gates.26 Large
26Until the 1980s it was common practice for manufacturers to deliver products directly to the individual
stores (see, for instance, Mercer, 1993). With increasing size retailers have gradually moved towards central
warehousing, so that manufacturers now usually deliver to a retailer distribution centre; see, e.g., Holmes
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retailers may increasingly act also as certiers of quality with respect to consumers, which
transforms both content and volume of their marketing activities.
That large retailers increasingly take over on a larger share of these functions and thus
of the value-added in the vertical relationship may often be due to e¢ ciency rationales,
such as the realization of economies of scale or scope. However, as the analysis in this paper
suggests with a focus on innovation, such a shift in functions may also arise ine¢ ciently,
in particular when it is due to the exercise of buyer power or is used as an instrument
to increase buyer power in the longer term. We showed how an ine¢ cient shift of inno-
vative activity away from manufacturers and towards large retailers may be due to their
gatekeeping role. Precisely, we showed how this gives rise to both a rent-appropriation
motive and a hold-up problem, both of which undermine a manufacturers and ine¢ ciently
increase a large retailers incentives. In addition, with retail competition a large retailer
can gain from what we termed innovation crowding outwhen his innovative activity
essentially crowds out that of the manufacturer, to the detriment of smaller competitors.
Our results should be of relevance for antitrust and competition policy in view of
increasing consolidation in the retailing industry and its implications for the growth and
exercise of buyer power. While competition policy should not interfere directly with the
allocation of functions in the vertical chain, still the preceding analysis my inform its stance
towards mergers and acquisitions that tend to increase buyer power.
(2011) and for WalMart and for developments in the UK Fernie et al. (2000) and Competition Commission
(2008). There is still a tendency towards further backwards integration, at least in parts of the food
retailing industry, with retailers collecting goods directly from suppliers rather than relying on supplier
delivery (factory-gate pricing).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We start with the following auxiliary observations. It is never
protable for the manufacturer to innovate if he expects the retailer to innovate, as his
payo¤would be negative, i.e.,  IM < 0. Conversely, if the manufacturer innovates, then it
could be still protable for the retailer to innovate. Precisely, whenever IR  IM holds, it
follows from (1) that the retailer will always choose to innovate, as he would, even for low
values of , never gain from trade with the manufacturer. This is easily seen by noticing
that   IR  (1  ), as the manufacturers rent must fulll   IM , which implies
  IR.
If, however, IR > IM holds, then we need to distinguish two cases:   IR and  > IR.
If   IR holds, then the retailer will only innovate if  = IR and  <  (if  < IR, the
retailer will refrain from innovation irrespective of ). The manufacturer will, however,
innovate whenever (2) holds.
Now suppose that  > IR holds (together with IR > IM). Note that (uI)   IR 
(1   ) + (u0) when    = IR=. It follows that for    <  it is (weakly)
protable for both the manufacturer and the retailer to innovate when they expect the
other to refrain from innovation. Thus, there are two equilibria when    < .
However, if it is the retailer who innovates, then both players can (at least weakly) benet
through coordinating on that the manufacturer innovates. In that case, the manufacturer
and the retailer gain  IM  0 and IR   0, respectively. Pareto dominance can be
further applied when  = . In that case, when coordinating on that the manufacturer
innovates (instead of the retailer), he gains   IM > 0 (as  > ), while the retailer
is indi¤erent between both outcomes. Hence, the equilibrium where the retailer innovates
can be ruled out. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Taking the retailers outside option into account, the man-
ufacturer will now innovate if and only if K  IM holds, which can be rewritten as
  IM=K = K . Further, notice that the retailer would never prefer to innovate himself
if the manufacturer chooses to innovate, as from (4) it follows that    IR     K
(strictly for any  < 1), where the right-hand side represents the retailers gain when the
manufacturer innovates and faces the threat of imitation.
Finally, there are multiple equilibria where either the manufacturer or the retailer
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innovates when  = K and > IR. However, the equilibrium where the retailer innovates
is (weakly) Pareto dominated. This follows from the manufacturer being indi¤erent, while
the retailer gains IR   K > 0 when coordinating on that the manufacturer innovates.
The rest of the argument is completely analogous to that of Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that by Lemma 2 the manufacturer always innovates if
he is the only one to do so, i.e., 2Nl > I follows from (1). If he expects the large retailer
to innovate, then he innovates only if nL  nM . The large retailer, however, innovates if
nL  nR (nL  nR) given that he expects the manufacturer to innovate (not to innovate),
with nR > n

R.
First, we characterize the equilibrium for Nl  I. It is straightforward to check that
nR 2 (1; N ] only when Nl  I. (The large retailer would never have an incentive to
innovate if Nl < I given that the manufacturer also decides to innovate.) Alternatively,
note that nR = N if Nl = I, while n

R < N for all Nl > I, so that n

R 2 (1; N ] holds
for Nl  I. Further notice that nM = N if Nl = I, while nM < N if Nl < I. In
summary, for nL  nR only the manufacturer innovates in equilibrium, as nL  nM always
holds for Nl  I. Notice that for nL = nR there are multiple equilibria where either both
or only the manufacturer innovates. However, the equilibrium where only the manufacturer
innovates (weakly) Pareto dominates the equilibrium where both innovate. That is, given
that both innovate the manufacturer gains nLl > 0 when both coordinate such that
he innovates alone, whereas the large retailer is indi¤erent between both outcomes at
nL = n

R .
Second, we characterize the equilibrium for Nl < I; which implies nM 2 (1; N ].
It follows that by Lemma 2 the manufacturer innovates when nL  nM . If, however,
nL > n

M , then the manufacturer will never innovate if the large retailer also innovates.
Nevertheless, by assumption (1) the manufacturer always prefers to innovate for nL > nM
when he expects the large retailer not to innovate. Recall also that nR > n

R. Multiple
equilibria, in which either the manufacturer or the large retailer innovates, can thus arise
when nL  nM and nL  nR hold. Otherwise, i.e., when either nL < nM , while nL  nR,
or nL  nM , while nL < nR, or nL < nM and nL < nR, only the manufacturer innovates
in equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate that for Nl < I multiplicity cannot be eliminated by only
selecting those equilibria which are not (weakly) Pareto dominated. Suppose that only
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the large retailer innovates in equilibrium. In that case, he obtains nL(uI ; u0)  I, while
the manufacturer obtains zero. If both the large retailer and the manufacturer coordinate
such that the manufacturer innovates instead, then the manufacturer gains 2Nl  I > 0,
whereas the large retailer gains  nLH + I, where H = (uI ; u0) (u0; uI) > h > l.
It is immediately checked that the large retailer always looses, as nL  I=H can never
hold because I=H < I=h = nR. When the manufacturer initially innovates, he always
loses by giving up the innovation (as nL  nM). We conclude that multiplicity cannot be
eliminated by selecting equilibria which are not Pareto dominated. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, we present some immediate results. Recall that the large
retailer always prefers imitation over innovation, as K  I. This implies that duplication
never occurs in equilibrium (neither for nL < nK nor for nL  nK), so that only the
manufacturer innovates in equilibrium when nL < nM . In the following, it thus remains
to characterize the equilibrium for nL  nM .
Second, we characterize the equilibrium for nL < nK (and nL  nM). As imitation is
not protable, it does not present a credible threat, so that the manufacturer is able to
appropriate nLl from the large retailer instead of K. The equilibrium thus corresponds
to that in Proposition 3 except that duplication never occurs.
Third, we characterize the equilibrium for nL  nK (and nL  nM). Recall that, in
case of innovation, the manufacturer obtains K from the large retailer, where K  nLl,
as nL  nK . The manufacturer thus innovates only if nL  nM = 2N   (I K)=l, where
nM = N if I = Nl+K, while n

M < N for all I > Nl+K, so that n

M 2 [nK ; N ] holds
for Nl + K  I  2Nl. Further, recall that nR 2 (1; N ] holds for I  Nh. From
(7) it follows that in case of Nh  Nl + K and K  N(h   l), respectively, the
manufacturer always innovates if he expects the large retailer not to innovate. However, in
case of Nh > Nl +K and K < N(h l), respectively, (and irrespective of whether
Nh > 2Nl or Nh  2Nl, as Nl  K for nK  N) the manufacturer innovates
only if nL  nM . Hence, we need to distinguish N(h  l)  K and N(h  l) > K.
In the former case, there are multiple equilibria, where either the manufacturer or the
large retailer innovates when nL  nR. Otherwise, i.e., nL < nR, only the manufacturer
innovates in equilibrium, as nL  nM always holds. (Notice that when N(h  l) = K
and nL = nM multiple equilibria where either only the manufacturer innovates or there is
a failure of innovation arise for nL < nR. However, the equilibrium where there is a failure
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of innovation can be ruled out, as it is (weakly) Pareto dominated by the equilibrium
where the manufacturer innovates alone: The manufacturer is indi¤erent between both
outcomes, while the large retailer (at least weakly) gains when the manufacturer innovates,
as nL  nK .) In the latter case, the equilibrium outcome in case of N(h  l)  K is
preserved when nL  nM . However, when nL > nM so that the manufacturer abstains
from innovation (albeit he would be the only one to innovate), we additionally obtain
the following: If nL  nR, then only the large retailer innovates in equilibrium, while,
otherwise, there is no innovation at all. (For nL = nR there are multiple equilibria where
either only the large retailer innovates or there is a failure of innovation. However, the
latter can be ruled out, as it is (weakly) Pareto dominated.)
Finally, we demonstrate that for nL  nK and provided that (15) holds multiple equi-
libria cannot be eliminated by selecting those which are not Pareto dominated whenever
nL  nM and nL  nR. Suppose that the large retailer innovates alone. Then, his payo¤ is
nL(uI ; u0)  I, while the manufacturers payo¤ is zero. When both coordinate such that
the manufacturer innovates instead, then the manufacturer gains (2N   nL)l +K   I,
which is weakly positive, as nL  nM . The large retailer gains nLl   K   nLH + I,
where H = (uI ; u0)   (u0; uI) > h > l, which is (weakly) positive only if K 
I[(uI ; uI)   (u0; u0)]=h and nL  (I   K)=e, with e = (uI ; u0)   (uI ; uI). As,
however, condition (15) species that nL > (I  K)=e the large retailers gain is strictly
negative. An analogous reasoning applies for the case in which the manufacturer initially
innovates: While the large retailer always benets, the manufacturer (weakly) loses by
giving up the innovation (as nL  nM). We conclude that for nL  nM and nL  nR
neither of the two pure strategy equilibria is Pareto dominant when (15) holds, so that
multiplicity prevails. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. By Lemma 3 we know the individual incentives to innovate
contingent on the expectations about the other players innovation decision, so that the
equilibrium of the innovation stage can be fully characterized.
First, we characterize the equilibrium for LNl  I. Notice that nM = N if I =
SNl and nM < N if SNl < I < S2Nl, so that n

M 2 (1; N ] holds for SNl 
I < S2Nl. Further, nR = N if I = LNl, while n

R < N for all I < LNl, so
that nR 2 (1; N ] holds for I  LNl. As SNl  LNl, it follows immediately that
in equilibrium there is duplication if nL > nR , while, otherwise, only the manufacturer
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innovates. Notice that for nL = nR there are multiple equilibria where either both or
only the manufacturer innovates. However, the equilibrium where only the manufacturer
innovates (weakly) Pareto dominates the equilibrium where both innovate. Precisely, given
that both innovate the manufacturer gains LnLl  0 (strictly if L > 0) when both
coordinate on that where only the manufacturer innovates, whereas the large retailer is
indi¤erent between both outcomes at nL = nR .
Second, we characterize the equilibrium for LNl < I which implies nM when addi-
tionally SNl  I < S2Nl (and excludes nR , as nR 2 (1; N ] holds for LNl  I).
It is straightforward that nR = N if I = Nh, while n

R < N if I < Nh, so that
nR 2 (1; N ] holds for I  Nh. Further, note that nM = N if I = (S + L)Nl,
while 1 < nM < N if (S + L)Nl < I < S2Nl, so that n

M 2 (1; N ] holds for
(S + L)Nl  I < S2Nl. From (7) it follows that in case of Nh < (S + L)Nl
the manufacturer always innovates if he expects the large retailer not to innovate. How-
ever, in case of Nh  (S + L)Nl (and irrespective of whether Nh > 2Nl or
Nh  2Nl when 1 > S  L, as (S +L)Nl < 2Nl) the manufacturer innovates
only if nL  nM . Hence, we need to distinguish S + L > h=l and S + L  h=l.
In the former case, multiplicity arises where either the manufacturer or the large retailer
innovates if nL  nM and nL  nR simultaneously hold. Otherwise, i.e., when either
nL < n

M , while nL  nR, or nL  nM , while nL < nR, or nL < nM and nL < nR, only
the manufacturer innovates in equilibrium. In the latter case, the equilibrium outcome
in case of S + L > h=l is preserved when nL < nM . However, when nL  nM ,
we additionally obtain: If nL  nR, then only the large retailer innovates in equilibrium,
while, otherwise, there is no innovation at all. Notice that for nL = nM and nL  nR,
i.e., the manufacturer is indi¤erent between innovating and and not innovating when he
expects the large retailer to abstain from innovation (multiplicity), while the large retailer
(weakly) prefers to innovate, the equilibrium where only the large retailer innovates is
(weakly) Pareto dominant, as (16) holds.
Finally, we demonstrate that in case of LNl < I and provided that (16) holds
multiple equilibria cannot be eliminated by selecting those equilibria which are Pareto
dominant whenever nM  nL(< nM) and nL  nR. Suppose that the large retailer inno-
vates alone in equilibrium. When both the large retailer and the manufacturer coordinate
such that the manufacturer innovates instead, then the large retailer gains (1 L)nLl 
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nLH + I, where H = (uI ; u0)  (u0; uI) > h > l, whereas the manufacturer gains
S(2N   nL)l+LnLl  I. The manufacturers gain is (weakly) positive, as nL  nM .
The large retailers gain is (weakly) positive only if L  [(uI ; uI)   (u0; u0)]=l and
nL  I=[e + Ll] simultaneously hold, with e = (uI ; u0)   (uI ; uI). As, however,
condition (16) species that nL > I=[e+ Ll], we can immediately infer that the large
retailers gain is strictly negative. When the manufacturer initially innovates, he always
loses by giving up the innovation (as nL  nM). We conclude that neither (pure strategy)
equilibrium is Pareto dominant when (16) holds, so that multiplicity prevails. Q.E.D.
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